Andrea

Over the past two decades, we have witnessed an exponential rise in number of transnational grassroots organizations and internationally oriented civil society actors. An entirely new range of social movements, networks, and organizations has surfaced internationally. For many researchers, the emergence of such organizations often collectively- and somewhat inaccurately-described as “global civil society,” was interpreted as a cause–effect spiral generated by the new economic realities of globalization. Under this view, globalization from above is countered by globalization from below. Nonetheless, one can rightly claim that such transnational organizations have managed in recent years to reformulate to a certain extent the question of urban poverty from the perspective of poor communities. Through which ways the urban poor - the forgotten ones of the globalization process- have gained a worldwide voice in the international development arena?

            While public policy analysis has studied extensively the role of advocacy networks within national politics, few studies have looked at the role of transnational advocacy networks. Keck and Sikkink (1999) define such systems as networks including actors that work internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of information and services. This description fits well into new urban slum upgrading developments undertaken by federated local community groups through enhanced support from government institutions (local or state) but also international development aid actors such as the World Bank, UN-Habitat and powerful foundations (Gates, Rockefeller).

            The Slum Dwellers International (SDI) was born under specific circumstances related to the failure of government policies and/or other Indian based organizations to take action against urban poverty in Mumbai, India. Although created in 1974, the event that triggered the greater community reaction was the 1976 bulldozing of the Janata Colony in Mumbai. This colony had endured a long fight to avoid demolition by the Indian government. Despite assurances issued by the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, the settlements were ultimately destroyed. After the demolition, Jockin Arputham, a community leader from Janata and founder of National Slum Dwellers in India, initiated the effort that would become the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF) of India and later on would grow into a transnational network of grassroots communities.

  

In many ways, the approach undertaken by SDI bears the characteristics of the “movement infrastructure model” developed by Andrews (2001). The movement is based on differentiated leadership structure that ranges from local community leaders to international directors lobbying at the international level. Such differentiated leadership allows communication to various audiences. The different communities are bounded by an organizational structure that relies on enhanced ties that cross geographic, cultural and social boundaries. Ultimately, the resources (financial but also in species for instance sweat equity etc) benefit from the support of its members but equally from significant donations from international and state agents.

This type of organization seemed to have made use of specific tactics when confronted with a project destined to ameliorate railway performance within Mumbai. Initially, similar projects have relied on extensive relocation of slum dwellers, far from the areas they were squatting. In the specific case of the Indian railways this strategy seemed logical: the slums were located such that they slowed train speeds and resulted in thousands of annual deaths and injuries on trains that carry more than six million passengers each way in daily commutes of more than an hour in trains that are often filled to 250 percent capacity. Through the use of the different tactics presented by Keck and Sikking, SDI managed to take a leading role in the process of relocation. The use of information politics through slum censuses provided a useful tool in order to start up negotiations with the State of Maharashtra. Equally, the coalition through active mobilization and usage of symbolic politics managed to present a positive image of the usually excluded slum dwellers through stories that can have an impact beyond the local. In addition, the strategic coalition leveraged the support of the WB, main funder of the project. Finally, the enhanced weight of the coalition has successfully leveraged guarantees that the government will fulfill its promises by providing housing for the displaced households.

While many questions remain as to what extent this heterogeneous network coalitions (grassroots organizations, development agencies) can move beyond the ephemeral, it seems that in many ways the approach undertaken by SDI has many of the characteristics developed by earlier social movements at the national level. More specifically, Andrews’ description of the tactics undertaken by the Mississippi Civil Rights movement, where action and reaction was combined to access-influence models bears many similarities to the philosophy and strategies of SDI.

Zoé Hamstead
The Occupy Movement is an international movement that arguable began when Wikileaks released Army helicopter footage from Iraq, (Dorling, 2011) but its first protest was held in Zuccotti Park in September of 2011, anniversary of Wall Street re-opening after Sept 11 attacks. Since then, there have been global protests in numerous parts of the world, including Australia, China, France, Spain, and Germany. Although critics argue that the Occupy Movement does not have specific goals, or demands that can be implemented in some way, it does have several centralizing principles. One, it advocates against social and income inequality, initially protesting against the role of banking in the economy. The primary mantra of the group is “we are the 99%,” referring to the large income gap between the wealthiest Americans and the rest of Americans. And two, it is committed to participatory democracy. Mechanistically, the broader organization is divided into working groups that are small enough for everyone to have their say and uses strategies to lift voices of volunteers from typically underrepresented social strata. Since the Occupy Movement began with the Wikileaks release and Occupy Wall Street, other Occupy spinoffs have arisen, such as Occupy Sandy, which organizes volunteers using themes of power and inequality in natural disaster recovery and frames a dialogue about capitalism and the climate. Occupy the Pipeline is another spinoff movement aimed at halting development of a natural gas pipeline that will run from New Jersey under the Hudson River and into the Meatpacking District by a company known for safety violations. Though difficult to demonstrate, proponents argue that the Occupy Movement has shifted the national dialogue from deficit reduction to economic problems of “ordinary” Americans and that it has encouraged nation such as Spain to adopt new standards toward the banking industry. The Occupy Movement is an interesting case study of social movements because the juxtaposition of its large membership against social equity goals and a commitment to participatory democracy necessitates that it functions in a decentralized way, opening questions about how social movements can explain the structure and functioning of such a group.

Mancur Olson (1965), in his discussion of Collective Action  begins with the premise that individuals would prefer to contribute as few resources as possible in order to acquire the benefits of group action. This follows from an assumption of individual self-interest. He argues that group size greatly affects the provisioning of goods that results from collective action in that individuals in large groups tend to lack enough incentive to contribute, and groups which are too small have a tendency to exploit those willing to contribute the most. Larger groups require coercion or an incentive structure to extract enough resources in order to provide the good. In applying this theory to the Occupy Movement, two questions arise – one of scale and one of the good itself. At one level, the Occupy Movement is very large and this larger movement utilizes social media to spread information, collect donations and generate other resources. However, at another level, it is comprised of working groups small enough in size that all members could potentially share an equal voice. Therefore, the movement represents some mixture of Olson’s group types, perhaps able to harness large amount of resources while not requiring coercion of its members (or vice-versa). However, the collective “good” that the Occupy Movement is trying to obtain, may vary widely from country to county or community to community. In general, its goals appear to be the acquisition of a political voice and power for underrepresented or disadvantaged in specific policy arenas. Functionally then, Olson’s model is likely to predict different outcomes at different levels of structural organization.

Keck and Sikkink (1999) claim that transnational advocacy networks are communicative structures which engage primarily in information exchange, and are most prevalent in issue areas where there is informational uncertainty. This claim is supported by the Occupy Movement’s origin in Wikileak’s video footage release, which brought to light otherwise unknown activities of the U.S. military in Iraq, as well as its use of social media to communicate information and organize activities. Much of the movement is focused on changing national-level policy by drawing the attention of a global network that recognizes and relates to similar issues of injustice and inequality in different forms. Though not exactly akin to the boomerang pattern, it does orient strategy around a highly distributed, but global network. Although this theory to some extent describes how the Occupy Movement arose, it is likely to predict that the movement will not be successful, as it does not address generally address bodily harm or legal opportunity per se. According to Keck and Sikkink, the extent to which policy diffusion and mutual transformation occurs through the movement will be the test of whether it is successful.

While both theories may explain aspects of the Occupy Movement (e.g., group size, information exchange), neither addresses the unique decentralized structural type of this particular group or network. How might goals, demands and outcomes be articulated differently at different levels of organization, such that the movement might at once have the strengths and weaknesses of both a large and small group? And how might the different levels of organization embodied in one advocacy network generate mutual transformation?


References

Dorling, P. (2011, October 29). Assange can still Occupy centre stage. The Sydney Morning Herald. Sydney, Australia. Retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/assange-can-still-occupy-centre-stage-20111028-1mo8x.html

Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. International Social Science Journal, 51(159), 89–101. doi:10.1111/1468-2451.00179

Olson, M. (1965). Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. The Logic of Collective Action (pp. 6–52). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


This is a very interesting application on Olson's theoretical underpinnings on collective action but also one that raises a lot of questions; for instance, on the role of social movements and collective action. By definition a social movement gains its strength from its mass mobilization. Understandably though, the bigger the movement the more difficult it is to avoid free riding. Perhaps the difference is between active and passive participants within the movement. One could argue that the small committees, where participation is active provide an arena for a different type of collective good or even personal benefits (perhaps for leading decision makers within the movement). In that sense responsibilities and free riding behavior can be affected by the existing role of someone in the movement, peer pressure etc. On the other hand, the fact that there are passive participants, not necessarily engaged in committees etc might reveal signs of free riding (since these people are engaged they can fight for my beliefs too). So once again, this is a great application that raises many interesting questions.   
Achilles

I agree a very interesting application of Olson's theory but I am concerned with the effectiveness of a movement to influence public policy. One might argue that the very structure of the OWS movement limited its ability to directly influence policy decisions in the US. If its intention was simply to bring awareness of the plight of the working class then this seemed a bit frivolous to me. The international versions of OWS seemed to result in some change I wonder if internationally the movement maintained its same structure or did it adapt? Or if the organization did not change its structure internationally what conditions resulted in different results?........Deon

Between Sociologists and Political Scientists most agree that organizations (political and non political) influence policy change, but to varying extents and at different points in the policy process. Burstein and Linton (2002) argue that there is inclusive evidence to support the four major hypotheses present in academic articles written about organizations, both political and non political, influencing policy change. Andrews (2001) argues those organizations who are able to gain access to policy makers are the most influential in long-term policy change. Both authors agree that disruption is a tool that organizations can use to effect policy change, although they do not agree on to what extent. The shift in power that disruption can cause, between the official and citizens or their organizing group, changes the social hierarchy and is worth investigating.

Burstein and Linton (2002) utilize information collected in both disciplines to test four hypotheses present in the debate: (a) political organizations have a substantial direct impact on policy change; (b) when public opinion on a policy is taken into account, political organizations’ direct impact will decline substantially or even disappear; (c) when political organizations have a direct impact on policy, the impact of political parties will be greater than the impact of interest groups; and (d) interest groups and social movement organizations (SMOs) will effect policy only to the extent that their activities provide elected officials with information and resources relevant to their prospects for reelection. After analyzing evidence used in over fifty articles across the two disciplines the authors find none of the hypotheses can be proven one way or the other, because the lack of empirical evidence in all the studies.  Their analysis provides us with a complete picture of the debate around organization’s capacity to influence the policy process: the evidence is inconclusive.

Andrews (2001) articles suggests that SMOs can have substantial impact on the policy process, at the local level in the policy implementation stage. From his perspective there are three classes of studies on social movements: access-reaction models, which has two perspectives, and the access-influence model. Incorporating elements of both of these models the author recommends a third perspective, which he calls the movement infrastructure model. His model suggests that leadership, organizational structure, and resources need to be explored to understand the influence an organization might have on policy change (Andrews, 75).

Most studies, Andrews argues, focus on one activity that organizations engage in order influence change, however this is not representative of the social movements he compares where, “multiple mechanisms of influence (including disruption, persuasion, and bargaining) will have the greatest impact on policy implementation” (75). Ultimately, Andrews claims that the organizations that were the most influential were able to build sustainable relationships with local governments and effect implementation and to capture the policy decision making processes surround the area of interest.

One point that Burstein and Andrews both agree, to some extent, was that the disruptive power of protests (a mode of dissent used by organizations) has potential to influence policy change. Whether policy change occurred or influence stopped at the agenda setting stage, or was thwarted by other powerful interest groups that stalled the change is debatable. What is not disputed is that a group of organized individuals has the capacity to influence policy makers at one stage of the policy process, whether its agenda setting, policy formation or implementation through disruptive behavior or perceived disruption.

Andrews argues that the action-reaction model focuses on disruption as a mode of action for organization and implicitly argues that influence is gained by an organization by fear of uncertainty, or fear of not being reelected. However, this power is only granted if the protests are visible and, arguably, only effective if they are persuasive (75). Hobbes argued that fear is essential to self-preservation and is a moral characteristic necessary for submission to political authority (Robin, p1089). On this line of logic, citizens should fear elected officials, since they are concerned with self-preservation. 

For organizations to be able to utilize fear as a form of dissent, or to signify dissatisfaction, argues a change in the power hierarchy of citizens and elected officials. The teachers Union strike in Chicago that last a week and ended with concessions from the government to the organized disruption (although non-violent) is a perfect example of this new power dynamic.

 Although the direct influences to policy change that organizations have might be difficult to detect, or evidence is inconclusive, as Burstein argues; it is clear that disruption can cause some kinds of policy change. The perception that elective officials have the power to make policy and either not be influenced by exogenous factors, or one group or another does not seem possible within this new power dynamic. 

Kelsey


Resources

Robin, Corey, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (2004).

Andrews, Kenneth T., “Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965 to 1971,” American Sociological Review, 66(1), 2001.

Burstein, Paul and April Linton, “The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns,” Social Forces, 81(2), 2002. 

One of the core foci of environmental protection movements and targeted environmental campaigns, is to control the message about their specific area of focus, and thus to influence 1) whether it makes it onto the policy making agenda, and 2) in what form it makes it onto the agenda. In this way, our discussion this week refers back to our discussion of Agenda setting, however the particular relevance of this stage of the policy making process to the environmental subsection of social movements is notable enough to consider on its own as we consider the relevance of social movements to public policy.

Consider the recent debate over hydrofracking and its regulation. Hydrofracking is a relatively new process which has enjoyed a surge due to new technical advancements, doubling the number of active natural gas wells in the US in just 20 years.  The well-timed “Halliburton loophole” in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 acted as a prophylactic against federal regulation by the EPA under the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). In addition, oil and gas exploration is exempt from the Resource Recovery and Response Act (RCRA), so that the considerable toxic wastes caused by hydrofracking, and sequestered in underground formations, are not regulated or inspected by federal agents. This left the process to be regulated by States, which in the absence of scientific knowledge about new fracking process and any well-organized opposition, have to varying degrees acceded to or adopted a “pro-jobs”, “pro-energy independence” or simply a “race to the bottom” mentality. States have passed various permutations of voluntary regulation measures, have caved to industry stances on the proprietary (and therefore secret) nature of the toxic fluid that they pump into the ground, and have drafted new measures to allow of for the taking of private property by natural gas companies and the supercedence of local regulations against fracking, such as local zoning laws.

As a result of the strong offensive by natural gas companies, environmental movements have scrambled to organize and to place the issue on national and state environmental protection agendas, after-the-fact of its addition to economic growth and energy agendas. The lack of regulation under federal laws which dictate primacy to state agencies, such as the SDWA, further challenges environmentalists to compel states to design and enact their own legislation without specific federal guidance. The success of this effort lies in their ability to re-frame the perception of fracking by the electorate and elected officials as a groundwater contamination and depletion concern, a greenhouse gas contributor, and a private and public land grab, etc. This effort is further complicated by another common conundrum in environmental policy: the policies being advocated for are entrepreneurial, as Wilson would describe them, yet they have very quantifiable costs to drillers (who are well-supported, politically) yet benefits which are, at first look, intangible to policymakers. The hydrofracking movement has built national- and local-level infrastructure to pursue a range of education efforts including grassroots political-style campaigns, protests, celebrity endorsements, and professional lobbying.  The largest amount of capital in the hydrofracking movement has been devoted to defining and communicating the ramifications of fracking, not to securing amenities or programs.

Herein is one difference between many environmental efforts and other social campaigns: the question under discussion with policymakers is not only “what do we want?”, but is “what have you been thinking when you look at this issue?”. Whereas some of the work that we are discussing in this area focuses on the impact of movements on the enaction and implementation phases of policy (such as Andrews or Burstein and Linton), I would argue that the disproportionately large issue-framing component of the hydrofracking campaign calls to light a specific difference between environmental movements generally and other social programs- namely, the requirement to achieve widespread public support, and to take momentum from private industry, prior to consideration of pro-active measures from policymakers.

Burstein and Linton (2002) in “ The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Social Movements Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns” argue that all three types of organizations have substantial impacts on policy. But specifically interest groups and social movement organizations will affect policy only to the extent that their activities provide politicians with information and resources relevant to the re-election campaign. This view of the role of interest groups and social movement organizations in the policy process seems to me somewhat diminished and should be qualified further. While I do feel that that these policy actors do provide a great deal of information regarding public opinion they also play an important part in shaping, cultivating and voicing public opinion and hence driving the policy process. In “Social Movements and Policies: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty”, Kenneth Andrews (2001) uses his “movement infrastructure” model to frame an analysis of social movements in the policy process. He demonstrates that social movements do in fact have the ability to shape public policy and programs and that this ability is enhanced when the movements possesses a strong infrastructure. In this paper I examine briefly the “Occupy Wall Street” movement within the context of both arguments in hopes of determining whether the worth of this movement was simply information provision or could it influence policy formulation.

“Occupy Wall Street” (OWS) began on September 17, 2011 when protesters occupied Zuccotti Park in Wall Street, New York City’s Financial district. The protest movement soon became a social movement that raised awareness to the social and economic inequality that exists in American society. The main issues were the greed, corruption and the influence of “big” financial corporations on government. The result they claimed was inequality in income and wealth distribution concentrated in the hands of 1% of the US population. The movement made consensus-based decisions determined at general assemblies, which focused on direct, protest action and petitioning of authorities for redress. The organization itself is structured along a consensus-based process composed of over 70 working groups and spokes councils. Decisions are made at assembly meetings, in which participants are given room for dissent, which allows for the formation of complex ideas.  The actual meetings do not have formal leadership and everyone present is allowed to speak with priorities given to women and minorities. This has created the perception that the organization itself has no leadership and in fact members argue its doesn’t rather leaders emerge when they are needed and fade back into the ranks when the necessary task is complete. This is to maintain the purity of the democratic structure of the organization.

If the aim of the OWS was exclusively to bring awareness to the inequalities that exist within US society then one can in fact make an argument for information provision as the role played by this social movement in the policy process. President Barack Obama during a news conference remarked that the organization was expressing the frustration felt after the financial crisis especially since the responsible parties were resistant to efforts to reduce future abusive practices. Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney would recant on an earlier statement he made condemning the protest action as dangerous and inciting class warfare later expressing sympathy for the participants. While House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi came out in support of the movement.  This evidence is consistent with the arguments made by Burstein and Linton that social movement organizations are able to influence the policy process by providing information to elected officials. However, Andrews’s argument also has some merit here, as when one examines the structure of the OWS it seems that the organization was intended to through its activities simply to bring awareness and therefore exert indirect influence on policy formulation. 

Andrews (2001) distinguishes between movements that are dramatic, disruptive and threatening to elites and those that garner sympathy and support by third parties as well as movements that acquire routine access to the polity through institutional tactics and movements that are able to effect change based on its leadership, organization and available resources. The Occupy Wall Street movement can easily fit into the first two models as it was dramatic, disruptive and threatening to elites and it did garner sympathy and support from third parties. Andrews (2001) maintains that movements that belong to these models shape the process of change by mobilizing other actors and have little or no direct influence. Within the framework presented by Andrews (2001) the OWS movement could not directly influence policy that will bring about income and wealth equality because it did not have a strong movement infrastructure, which includes a strong leadership structure, and organization that crosses social and geographic boundaries and a resource based that draws substantially on its members for both labor and money. Therefore in assessing the role of social movements organizations in the policy process one must consider the infrastructure of the specific organization as this determines the ability of the organization to directly or indirectly influence public policy formulation.


By Deon Gibson

References

Burstein, Paul and April Linton, “The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns,” Social Forces, 81(2), 2002

Andrews, Kenneth T., “Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965 to 1971,” American Sociological Review, 66(1), 2001