Consider the recent debate over hydrofracking and its regulation. Hydrofracking is a relatively new process which has enjoyed a surge due to new technical advancements, doubling the number of active natural gas wells in the US in just 20 years. The well-timed “Halliburton loophole” in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 acted as a prophylactic against federal regulation by the EPA under the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). In addition, oil and gas exploration is exempt from the Resource Recovery and Response Act (RCRA), so that the considerable toxic wastes caused by hydrofracking, and sequestered in underground formations, are not regulated or inspected by federal agents. This left the process to be regulated by States, which in the absence of scientific knowledge about new fracking process and any well-organized opposition, have to varying degrees acceded to or adopted a “pro-jobs”, “pro-energy independence” or simply a “race to the bottom” mentality. States have passed various permutations of voluntary regulation measures, have caved to industry stances on the proprietary (and therefore secret) nature of the toxic fluid that they pump into the ground, and have drafted new measures to allow of for the taking of private property by natural gas companies and the supercedence of local regulations against fracking, such as local zoning laws.
As a result of the strong offensive by natural gas companies, environmental movements have scrambled to organize and to place the issue on national and state environmental protection agendas, after-the-fact of its addition to economic growth and energy agendas. The lack of regulation under federal laws which dictate primacy to state agencies, such as the SDWA, further challenges environmentalists to compel states to design and enact their own legislation without specific federal guidance. The success of this effort lies in their ability to re-frame the perception of fracking by the electorate and elected officials as a groundwater contamination and depletion concern, a greenhouse gas contributor, and a private and public land grab, etc. This effort is further complicated by another common conundrum in environmental policy: the policies being advocated for are entrepreneurial, as Wilson would describe them, yet they have very quantifiable costs to drillers (who are well-supported, politically) yet benefits which are, at first look, intangible to policymakers. The hydrofracking movement has built national- and local-level infrastructure to pursue a range of education efforts including grassroots political-style campaigns, protests, celebrity endorsements, and professional lobbying. The largest amount of capital in the hydrofracking movement has been devoted to defining and communicating the ramifications of fracking, not to securing amenities or programs.
Herein is one difference between many environmental efforts and other social campaigns: the question under discussion with policymakers is not only “what do we want?”, but is “what have you been thinking when you look at this issue?”. Whereas some of the work that we are discussing in this area focuses on the impact of movements on the enaction and implementation phases of policy (such as Andrews or Burstein and Linton), I would argue that the disproportionately large issue-framing component of the hydrofracking campaign calls to light a specific difference between environmental movements generally and other social programs- namely, the requirement to achieve widespread public support, and to take momentum from private industry, prior to consideration of pro-active measures from policymakers.