Between Sociologists and Political Scientists most agree that organizations (political and non political) influence policy change, but to varying extents and at different points in the policy process. Burstein and Linton (2002) argue that there is inclusive evidence to support the four major hypotheses present in academic articles written about organizations, both political and non political, influencing policy change. Andrews (2001) argues those organizations who are able to gain access to policy makers are the most influential in long-term policy change. Both authors agree that disruption is a tool that organizations can use to effect policy change, although they do not agree on to what extent. The shift in power that disruption can cause, between the official and citizens or their organizing group, changes the social hierarchy and is worth investigating.

Burstein and Linton (2002) utilize information collected in both disciplines to test four hypotheses present in the debate: (a) political organizations have a substantial direct impact on policy change; (b) when public opinion on a policy is taken into account, political organizations’ direct impact will decline substantially or even disappear; (c) when political organizations have a direct impact on policy, the impact of political parties will be greater than the impact of interest groups; and (d) interest groups and social movement organizations (SMOs) will effect policy only to the extent that their activities provide elected officials with information and resources relevant to their prospects for reelection. After analyzing evidence used in over fifty articles across the two disciplines the authors find none of the hypotheses can be proven one way or the other, because the lack of empirical evidence in all the studies.  Their analysis provides us with a complete picture of the debate around organization’s capacity to influence the policy process: the evidence is inconclusive.

Andrews (2001) articles suggests that SMOs can have substantial impact on the policy process, at the local level in the policy implementation stage. From his perspective there are three classes of studies on social movements: access-reaction models, which has two perspectives, and the access-influence model. Incorporating elements of both of these models the author recommends a third perspective, which he calls the movement infrastructure model. His model suggests that leadership, organizational structure, and resources need to be explored to understand the influence an organization might have on policy change (Andrews, 75).

Most studies, Andrews argues, focus on one activity that organizations engage in order influence change, however this is not representative of the social movements he compares where, “multiple mechanisms of influence (including disruption, persuasion, and bargaining) will have the greatest impact on policy implementation” (75). Ultimately, Andrews claims that the organizations that were the most influential were able to build sustainable relationships with local governments and effect implementation and to capture the policy decision making processes surround the area of interest.

One point that Burstein and Andrews both agree, to some extent, was that the disruptive power of protests (a mode of dissent used by organizations) has potential to influence policy change. Whether policy change occurred or influence stopped at the agenda setting stage, or was thwarted by other powerful interest groups that stalled the change is debatable. What is not disputed is that a group of organized individuals has the capacity to influence policy makers at one stage of the policy process, whether its agenda setting, policy formation or implementation through disruptive behavior or perceived disruption.

Andrews argues that the action-reaction model focuses on disruption as a mode of action for organization and implicitly argues that influence is gained by an organization by fear of uncertainty, or fear of not being reelected. However, this power is only granted if the protests are visible and, arguably, only effective if they are persuasive (75). Hobbes argued that fear is essential to self-preservation and is a moral characteristic necessary for submission to political authority (Robin, p1089). On this line of logic, citizens should fear elected officials, since they are concerned with self-preservation. 

For organizations to be able to utilize fear as a form of dissent, or to signify dissatisfaction, argues a change in the power hierarchy of citizens and elected officials. The teachers Union strike in Chicago that last a week and ended with concessions from the government to the organized disruption (although non-violent) is a perfect example of this new power dynamic.

 Although the direct influences to policy change that organizations have might be difficult to detect, or evidence is inconclusive, as Burstein argues; it is clear that disruption can cause some kinds of policy change. The perception that elective officials have the power to make policy and either not be influenced by exogenous factors, or one group or another does not seem possible within this new power dynamic. 

Kelsey


Resources

Robin, Corey, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (2004).

Andrews, Kenneth T., “Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965 to 1971,” American Sociological Review, 66(1), 2001.

Burstein, Paul and April Linton, “The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns,” Social Forces, 81(2), 2002. 





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    social movements

    This week we discuss the role of bottom-up social movements and ideological engagement in policymaking.

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