The inclusion of ethical considerations into policy analysis creates a critical appreciation of the limits to which traditional economic tools and analysis ought to be employed in shaping and evaluating public policy. Contrary to the dominant theoretical dichotomy between “value-free” economic theory and moral values, moral questions are necessary interrogations that can inform analysis and shape policy recommendations. As Amy argues, in many instances moral issues arise. The example of abortion is a pertinent, and perhaps one that is often used to showcase how such moral considerations cannot be shunned but on the contrary represent integral parts of the analysis process. Often though, policy analysis through its nature and interaction to the institutional, bureaucratic and professional policy fields neglects those ethical aspects. This neglect can bias not only the definition of policy goals but also the analysis process itself.
Perhaps the cost-benefit analysis, a widely used policy tool, reveals better than any thing else the inherent tension between ethics and policy analysis. As Amy argues, “cost-benefit analysis is popular in policy analysis because it gives the appearance of ethical analysis without involving the risks.” (1984: 587). Indeed, cost-benefit analysis is looking at the aggregation of personal preferences, while rejecting inter-personal comparisons of well-being. In other words, thorugh the analysis we get a clear picture of aggregate costs and benefits that describe the well-being and preferences of a community, society, state or nation. At the same time, by considering levels of utility and preference satisfaction as the fundamental measure of human well-being, welfare economics refutes the moral utilitarian principle as formulated by Bentham: “it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.” The Pareto optimality principle rejects redistributions (because someone is made worse off and individual utilities cannot be compared), thus removing the moral basis of utilitarianism from welfare economics (Staveren, 2007). Therefore, by absorbing morality into subjective and incomparable individual preferences, cost-benefit analysis has effectively removed ethical evaluation from the policy discussion.
The implications of this fundamental theoretical presupposition in terms of policy are indeed important. The focus on preference satisfaction fails to link up with the normative terms of policy debate, and it leads to difficulties and implausible implications when preferences change and conflict. If we look beyond theoretical models, such alterations and clashes of preferences are evident in a plethora of scenarios in the public policy realm.
Indeed, even though the cost-benefit framework, at least implicitly acknowledges the importance of individual liberties, it fails to integrate the larger nexus of morally significant values that influence social action and policy outcomes. Such values consist of individual freedoms, rights –formal or moral – and perceptions of equality within a society. For a policy to be accepted and successfully implemented one can argue that welfare increases are not the sole condition; respecting rights, freedoms and perceptions of equality appear similarly important. And what seems to matter is the perception of a society’s and its citizens’ rights, freedoms and equality. Such perception is built upon specific historical contexts and traditions that carry along and transmit ethical values. For instance, the opponents to the extension of public health care in the US, although often center their discourse on economic arguments, seem to draw their influence from deeper ideological perceptions on who has the right to health care and to what extent the state is responsible to provide this service. Equally, the current reactions to the decline of welfare benefits in Southern European countries cannot only be understood in terms of a decrease in welfare, but also as a redefinition of workers and pensioners rights at the basis of a larger effort to balance cost and benefits and which in the long term, does seem to promote economic solvency and not ethical values of justice, fairness and equality.
In that sense, policies that aim to the redistribution of resources should be first thought under the scope of the shift they create in terms of moral values, freedoms and rights. Beyond the obvious question; how can we achieve a wider evaluation framework of public policies, one that moves beyond the maximization of welfare -- assuming that maximization is clearly measurable – and considers moral values within a society, another issue emerges: that of the role of the policy analyst towards not only his client but towards the society he is evolving in. Certainly, as Patton and Sawicki suggest this issue does not have a clear answer. While the reflective questions that Tong develops (see Patton and Sawicki, 1986:43) or the principles that Lindblom suggests (idem) can provide useful guides for analysis, developing a moral code seems difficult not so much due to the “passivity” of analysts and their tendency to follow orders or satisfy the client but more so, due to the moral baggage that analysts bring in their analysis and the utopic belief that an analyst is impartial and ideologically neutral. In that sense, policies and analysts cannot be understood outside their specific moral context.
References:
Patton, Carl V. and David S. Sawicki, Chapter 2: “The Policy Analysis Process”, pp. 30-46, in
Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning, Prentice Hall, 1993.
Amy, Douglas J., “Why Policy Analysis and Ethics are Incompatible,” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management, 3(4), 1984.
Staveren, Irene. "Beyond Utilitarianism and Deontology: Ethics in Economics," Review of Political Economy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 21-35. 2007.
Perhaps the cost-benefit analysis, a widely used policy tool, reveals better than any thing else the inherent tension between ethics and policy analysis. As Amy argues, “cost-benefit analysis is popular in policy analysis because it gives the appearance of ethical analysis without involving the risks.” (1984: 587). Indeed, cost-benefit analysis is looking at the aggregation of personal preferences, while rejecting inter-personal comparisons of well-being. In other words, thorugh the analysis we get a clear picture of aggregate costs and benefits that describe the well-being and preferences of a community, society, state or nation. At the same time, by considering levels of utility and preference satisfaction as the fundamental measure of human well-being, welfare economics refutes the moral utilitarian principle as formulated by Bentham: “it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.” The Pareto optimality principle rejects redistributions (because someone is made worse off and individual utilities cannot be compared), thus removing the moral basis of utilitarianism from welfare economics (Staveren, 2007). Therefore, by absorbing morality into subjective and incomparable individual preferences, cost-benefit analysis has effectively removed ethical evaluation from the policy discussion.
The implications of this fundamental theoretical presupposition in terms of policy are indeed important. The focus on preference satisfaction fails to link up with the normative terms of policy debate, and it leads to difficulties and implausible implications when preferences change and conflict. If we look beyond theoretical models, such alterations and clashes of preferences are evident in a plethora of scenarios in the public policy realm.
Indeed, even though the cost-benefit framework, at least implicitly acknowledges the importance of individual liberties, it fails to integrate the larger nexus of morally significant values that influence social action and policy outcomes. Such values consist of individual freedoms, rights –formal or moral – and perceptions of equality within a society. For a policy to be accepted and successfully implemented one can argue that welfare increases are not the sole condition; respecting rights, freedoms and perceptions of equality appear similarly important. And what seems to matter is the perception of a society’s and its citizens’ rights, freedoms and equality. Such perception is built upon specific historical contexts and traditions that carry along and transmit ethical values. For instance, the opponents to the extension of public health care in the US, although often center their discourse on economic arguments, seem to draw their influence from deeper ideological perceptions on who has the right to health care and to what extent the state is responsible to provide this service. Equally, the current reactions to the decline of welfare benefits in Southern European countries cannot only be understood in terms of a decrease in welfare, but also as a redefinition of workers and pensioners rights at the basis of a larger effort to balance cost and benefits and which in the long term, does seem to promote economic solvency and not ethical values of justice, fairness and equality.
In that sense, policies that aim to the redistribution of resources should be first thought under the scope of the shift they create in terms of moral values, freedoms and rights. Beyond the obvious question; how can we achieve a wider evaluation framework of public policies, one that moves beyond the maximization of welfare -- assuming that maximization is clearly measurable – and considers moral values within a society, another issue emerges: that of the role of the policy analyst towards not only his client but towards the society he is evolving in. Certainly, as Patton and Sawicki suggest this issue does not have a clear answer. While the reflective questions that Tong develops (see Patton and Sawicki, 1986:43) or the principles that Lindblom suggests (idem) can provide useful guides for analysis, developing a moral code seems difficult not so much due to the “passivity” of analysts and their tendency to follow orders or satisfy the client but more so, due to the moral baggage that analysts bring in their analysis and the utopic belief that an analyst is impartial and ideologically neutral. In that sense, policies and analysts cannot be understood outside their specific moral context.
References:
Patton, Carl V. and David S. Sawicki, Chapter 2: “The Policy Analysis Process”, pp. 30-46, in
Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning, Prentice Hall, 1993.
Amy, Douglas J., “Why Policy Analysis and Ethics are Incompatible,” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management, 3(4), 1984.
Staveren, Irene. "Beyond Utilitarianism and Deontology: Ethics in Economics," Review of Political Economy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 21-35. 2007.
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