Andrea
How can policy research distort and obfuscate social and economic realities? In this week’s readings, Shulock (1999) presents the paradox of society’s heavy investment in policy analysis, despite substantive evidence and theories suggesting that analysis is not used to make better policies. Mead (1983) finds that analysis can interact with problems to make them different and more difficult to solve than they would be without analysis. Mead partially points to the fact that policy analysts measure success and effectiveness based on the criteria of policy chosen, rather than carried out.
The disconnect between optimal choice and optimal implementation is at least partially to blame for the lack of effectiveness attributed to policy analysis, and adherence to conservative models of incremental change prevent systemic change from being achieved.
For those in the field, these are rather bleak pronouncements: a growing and heavily invested in professional industry that is not effective? This seems like bad news for academic institutions that teach these professionals their craft, government and other bodies that rely on their skills and output, and, of course, policy analysts themselves.
Despite these findings, cities continue to rely on analysts (and the legislators they inform) as the drivers of urban policy agendas. In many cities, this is a continuation of the status quo policy formula and policymaking players – mayor, city council, issue advocates, etc. But other cities have changed how policy is made, either by changing participatory processes or introducing new policymaking authorities into the existing political landscape.
In March 2013, the governor of Michigan appointed an emergency fiscal manager to take over Detroit’s finances. The role of the emergency manager, Kevyn Orr, a Washington bankruptcy lawyer, is to improve services and bring fiscal discipline to the state’s largest city, including making decisions on how to stem the city’s mounting cash shortfall and reduce an estimated $14 billion in long-term liabilities. Orr will have the final word on Detroit’s budget expenditures and fiscal policies, and can make decisions about public salaries and service cuts.
Despite the seeming single authoritativeness of this role, Orr’s position as emergency manager is consistent with Mead’s analysis of the challenges and inefficiencies of the roles of policy analysts. Mead finds, analysts are not independent enough from bureaucracy to have political influence in their own right; they are most influential when their influence is by way of their work, becoming entrepreneurs for programs. Orr’s position reinforces this finding: his influence and position comes from a bureaucratic mandate, and the exertion of Orr’s power is as an “entrepreneur” for improving the fiscal situation in Detroit.
The kinds of long-term changes Orr makes will be primarily incremental. Those changes that are not, such as cutting salaries or eliminating inefficient services, will shed light on the poor job being done by government. These actions and roles are also consistent with Mead’s assessment of the role of policy analysts.
Here, we can return to the concern’s raised by Shulock (1999): Will Orr’s actions based on his analysis of the fiscal crisis in Detroit make a significant contribution to the long-term solution of the city’s pressing policy problems?
Using her “interpretative” framework, Shulock might argue that if Orr is successful in using analysis and action as a language for framing political discourse, a legitimate rationalization of legislative action, and a symbol of legitimate decision-making processes, he will succeed in reshaping Detroit’s policy landscape and eradicating its dysfunction.
Resources:
Mead, Lawrence M., “The Interaction Problem in Policy Analysis,” Policy Sciences, 16(1), 1983.
Shulock, Nancy, “The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18(2), 1999. (BB)
Vlasic, Bill. “Lawyer Outlines Challenges in New Job Fixing Detroit” The New York Times. March 25, 2013.
Yaccino, Steven. “Detroit’s Leaders Carry on, but Know Who’s Really in Charge.” The New York Times. April 12, 2013.
How can policy research distort and obfuscate social and economic realities? In this week’s readings, Shulock (1999) presents the paradox of society’s heavy investment in policy analysis, despite substantive evidence and theories suggesting that analysis is not used to make better policies. Mead (1983) finds that analysis can interact with problems to make them different and more difficult to solve than they would be without analysis. Mead partially points to the fact that policy analysts measure success and effectiveness based on the criteria of policy chosen, rather than carried out.
The disconnect between optimal choice and optimal implementation is at least partially to blame for the lack of effectiveness attributed to policy analysis, and adherence to conservative models of incremental change prevent systemic change from being achieved.
For those in the field, these are rather bleak pronouncements: a growing and heavily invested in professional industry that is not effective? This seems like bad news for academic institutions that teach these professionals their craft, government and other bodies that rely on their skills and output, and, of course, policy analysts themselves.
Despite these findings, cities continue to rely on analysts (and the legislators they inform) as the drivers of urban policy agendas. In many cities, this is a continuation of the status quo policy formula and policymaking players – mayor, city council, issue advocates, etc. But other cities have changed how policy is made, either by changing participatory processes or introducing new policymaking authorities into the existing political landscape.
In March 2013, the governor of Michigan appointed an emergency fiscal manager to take over Detroit’s finances. The role of the emergency manager, Kevyn Orr, a Washington bankruptcy lawyer, is to improve services and bring fiscal discipline to the state’s largest city, including making decisions on how to stem the city’s mounting cash shortfall and reduce an estimated $14 billion in long-term liabilities. Orr will have the final word on Detroit’s budget expenditures and fiscal policies, and can make decisions about public salaries and service cuts.
Despite the seeming single authoritativeness of this role, Orr’s position as emergency manager is consistent with Mead’s analysis of the challenges and inefficiencies of the roles of policy analysts. Mead finds, analysts are not independent enough from bureaucracy to have political influence in their own right; they are most influential when their influence is by way of their work, becoming entrepreneurs for programs. Orr’s position reinforces this finding: his influence and position comes from a bureaucratic mandate, and the exertion of Orr’s power is as an “entrepreneur” for improving the fiscal situation in Detroit.
The kinds of long-term changes Orr makes will be primarily incremental. Those changes that are not, such as cutting salaries or eliminating inefficient services, will shed light on the poor job being done by government. These actions and roles are also consistent with Mead’s assessment of the role of policy analysts.
Here, we can return to the concern’s raised by Shulock (1999): Will Orr’s actions based on his analysis of the fiscal crisis in Detroit make a significant contribution to the long-term solution of the city’s pressing policy problems?
Using her “interpretative” framework, Shulock might argue that if Orr is successful in using analysis and action as a language for framing political discourse, a legitimate rationalization of legislative action, and a symbol of legitimate decision-making processes, he will succeed in reshaping Detroit’s policy landscape and eradicating its dysfunction.
Resources:
Mead, Lawrence M., “The Interaction Problem in Policy Analysis,” Policy Sciences, 16(1), 1983.
Shulock, Nancy, “The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18(2), 1999. (BB)
Vlasic, Bill. “Lawyer Outlines Challenges in New Job Fixing Detroit” The New York Times. March 25, 2013.
Yaccino, Steven. “Detroit’s Leaders Carry on, but Know Who’s Really in Charge.” The New York Times. April 12, 2013.
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