Claude Joseph
This essay argues that no democracy can be representative unless its bureaucracy is representative. Such a claim challenges two dominant contentious approaches in public policy. The first is the rational paradigm that stresses the comprehensive and problem-solving model in policy analysis. The second is the constructivism, a post-positivist approach that sees policy analysis as a battle over meaning, framing and symbol. Policy analysts, in the first model, are neutral actors that devise policies based on scientific principles such as cost-benefit analysis. Whereas, the second model views policy analysts as contributors to the democratic process not via problem-solving, but rather by framing issues to improve public discourse.
Both views show – implicitly and explicitly – the inescapable role of policy analysis in society, which is indeed an undeniable fact. Nancy Shulock in “The Paradox of Policy Analysis,” and David Weimer in “Enriching Public Discourse: Policy Analysis in Representative Democracies” both demonstrate the critical importance of policy analysis. To Shulock, policy analysis is a tool of the democratic process. Likewise, Weimer (2002) contends that “policy analysts can make a contribution to debate by encouraging a more dynamic view of the world” (p. 62). He goes further to say that policy analysts contribute to distributional values by speaking for the less-representative interests. How so? The author’s response is that this can be achieved by using cost-benefit analysis, because “cost-benefit analysis forces consideration of diffuse interests that often remain silent” (p. 63).
Nothing is farther from the truth than an approach aiming at promoting the public interest by relying on an efficiency-driven technique such as cost-benefit analysis. The sealed bidding technique used under mayor Rudy Giuliani administration to contract out public services in New York is a case in point. The sealed bidding method, which limits the discretionary power of bureaucrats, turn out to favour big corporations to the detriment of minority business enterprises (MBEs). In contrast to big businesses, MBEs do not possess sufficient expertise and money to compete for contracts. As it happens, a democratic society with a bureaucracy that relies exclusively on efficiency as a means to distribute resources can end up being an instrument used by the well-off at the expense of the “diffuse interests that often remain silent.”
The constructivist approach, although it rejects the comprehensive and problem-solving perspective, is not an alternative however. The constructivist theorists opt for deliberation so policies can emerge from consensus in, say, community. Again, such a process will give an upper hand to those able to articulate and convey better their ideas in communities.
While Weimer emphasizes the importance of policy analysis to foster participation, he does not grasp the best way that can occur. One ideal solution is what Donald Kinsley in 1944 referred to as representative bureaucracy. The fundamental premise of representative bureaucracy is that active representation, or the selection of civil servants whose social backgrounds are similar to those of the people whom they serve, leads to active representation wherein the bureaucrat is expected to press and advocate for the interests of those he is presumed to represent. In other words, the concept of representative bureaucracy, according to Selden (1997), suggests that a bureaucracy that employs a cross section of American society will produce policy outcomes and outputs that reflect the interests and needs of all groups. Thus, a representative bureaucracy is a bureaucracy that reflects diversity of the general population, and it implies a symbolic commitment to equal access to power (Selden, 1997).
For example, Meier and Steward (1992) found that the presence of African-American schoolteachers, known as street level bureaucrats, had a significant effect on policy outcomes favoring African-American students. Likewise, analysing the Farmers Home Administration’s (FmHA) Rural Loans Program, Sally Coleman Selden found that districts that employ more African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, Native American and women award more rural housing loans to these groups.
Pointing out the pervasiveness of policy analysis, Dolan and Rosenbloom (2003) argues that American bureaucracy makes more rules than congress and the state legislature make laws, and most disputes are adjudicated in administrative hearing than civil matters decided by the courts. Therefore, given this fact, a representative bureaucracy does not only legitimize policies but also make democracy a concept not devoid of practical substance.
-Comment-
Claude,
Sealed bidding is a procurement practice which is used by a number of federal and state agencies in order to force them to take the bid submitted by the lowest responsible bidder. I agree with you, that this practice can lead to the exclusion of Minority and Women-Owned Enterprises, who are often smaller and more expensive than non-certifed business. However, it also leads to the exclusion of politically connected firms who place higher bids counting on their connections with administrators to seal the deal. In this way, it gives a "voice" to the taxpayer, whose interests can sometimes be overridden during the procurement process. In this interpretation, I think that sealed bidding can fit nicely into the idea of 'representative bureaucracy' as an extension of the traditional representative democracy (characterized only by the representation of constituent interests by officials and government edifices) although not necessarily into the demographical and culturally responsive model that you are cultivating.
Just a thought.
This essay argues that no democracy can be representative unless its bureaucracy is representative. Such a claim challenges two dominant contentious approaches in public policy. The first is the rational paradigm that stresses the comprehensive and problem-solving model in policy analysis. The second is the constructivism, a post-positivist approach that sees policy analysis as a battle over meaning, framing and symbol. Policy analysts, in the first model, are neutral actors that devise policies based on scientific principles such as cost-benefit analysis. Whereas, the second model views policy analysts as contributors to the democratic process not via problem-solving, but rather by framing issues to improve public discourse.
Both views show – implicitly and explicitly – the inescapable role of policy analysis in society, which is indeed an undeniable fact. Nancy Shulock in “The Paradox of Policy Analysis,” and David Weimer in “Enriching Public Discourse: Policy Analysis in Representative Democracies” both demonstrate the critical importance of policy analysis. To Shulock, policy analysis is a tool of the democratic process. Likewise, Weimer (2002) contends that “policy analysts can make a contribution to debate by encouraging a more dynamic view of the world” (p. 62). He goes further to say that policy analysts contribute to distributional values by speaking for the less-representative interests. How so? The author’s response is that this can be achieved by using cost-benefit analysis, because “cost-benefit analysis forces consideration of diffuse interests that often remain silent” (p. 63).
Nothing is farther from the truth than an approach aiming at promoting the public interest by relying on an efficiency-driven technique such as cost-benefit analysis. The sealed bidding technique used under mayor Rudy Giuliani administration to contract out public services in New York is a case in point. The sealed bidding method, which limits the discretionary power of bureaucrats, turn out to favour big corporations to the detriment of minority business enterprises (MBEs). In contrast to big businesses, MBEs do not possess sufficient expertise and money to compete for contracts. As it happens, a democratic society with a bureaucracy that relies exclusively on efficiency as a means to distribute resources can end up being an instrument used by the well-off at the expense of the “diffuse interests that often remain silent.”
The constructivist approach, although it rejects the comprehensive and problem-solving perspective, is not an alternative however. The constructivist theorists opt for deliberation so policies can emerge from consensus in, say, community. Again, such a process will give an upper hand to those able to articulate and convey better their ideas in communities.
While Weimer emphasizes the importance of policy analysis to foster participation, he does not grasp the best way that can occur. One ideal solution is what Donald Kinsley in 1944 referred to as representative bureaucracy. The fundamental premise of representative bureaucracy is that active representation, or the selection of civil servants whose social backgrounds are similar to those of the people whom they serve, leads to active representation wherein the bureaucrat is expected to press and advocate for the interests of those he is presumed to represent. In other words, the concept of representative bureaucracy, according to Selden (1997), suggests that a bureaucracy that employs a cross section of American society will produce policy outcomes and outputs that reflect the interests and needs of all groups. Thus, a representative bureaucracy is a bureaucracy that reflects diversity of the general population, and it implies a symbolic commitment to equal access to power (Selden, 1997).
For example, Meier and Steward (1992) found that the presence of African-American schoolteachers, known as street level bureaucrats, had a significant effect on policy outcomes favoring African-American students. Likewise, analysing the Farmers Home Administration’s (FmHA) Rural Loans Program, Sally Coleman Selden found that districts that employ more African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, Native American and women award more rural housing loans to these groups.
Pointing out the pervasiveness of policy analysis, Dolan and Rosenbloom (2003) argues that American bureaucracy makes more rules than congress and the state legislature make laws, and most disputes are adjudicated in administrative hearing than civil matters decided by the courts. Therefore, given this fact, a representative bureaucracy does not only legitimize policies but also make democracy a concept not devoid of practical substance.
-Comment-
Claude,
Sealed bidding is a procurement practice which is used by a number of federal and state agencies in order to force them to take the bid submitted by the lowest responsible bidder. I agree with you, that this practice can lead to the exclusion of Minority and Women-Owned Enterprises, who are often smaller and more expensive than non-certifed business. However, it also leads to the exclusion of politically connected firms who place higher bids counting on their connections with administrators to seal the deal. In this way, it gives a "voice" to the taxpayer, whose interests can sometimes be overridden during the procurement process. In this interpretation, I think that sealed bidding can fit nicely into the idea of 'representative bureaucracy' as an extension of the traditional representative democracy (characterized only by the representation of constituent interests by officials and government edifices) although not necessarily into the demographical and culturally responsive model that you are cultivating.
Just a thought.
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