While policy analysis has been often understood as a rational, linear, clear process based on elegant theoretical frameworks and welfare economics tools that provide the basis for taking decisions, the reality of policy making has repeatedly shown that not only the policy process is indeed messier but equally, that the analysis of this process is often too restricted in accommodating and integrating the realities of decision making. Perhaps the shift from rational choice models towards more dynamic pluralist ones has been an effort to rethink the analysis process by encompassing a more realistic approach of what policy analysis can offer. Still, one can wonder what is the role of policy analysis is in an era characterized by the "triumph of the postmodern sensibility in the domain of policy," which favors anecdotes over policy substance, pessimism over the incrementalist's optimism, passion over reason, and media sound bites over reasoned political discourse (Shulock, 2003 and Kirp, 1992 cited in Shulock). Is traditional policy analysis dead or is it reinventing itself as a discipline in order to reflect the actual policy process?
Shulock (2003) provides an interesting insight to the question above when she argues that:
“The problem, is only that policy analysts, policymakers, and observers alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. Policy analysis has changed, right along with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse that shapes citizen preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political environment.” (p. 240). Under this view, policy analysis has a larger than what we usually perceive role. It is less rational-objective, although it provides the “appearance” of rationality, and more ideologically biased; in that sense, it does not provide solutions to problems but it becomes a weapon in the battle to shape debate, claim jurisdiction, and gain public approval of legislative activity.
Perhaps the recent story on the influential paper by Ken Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart
“Growth in a Time of Debt” can shed further light on the ways policy making is influenced by analysis but also on the ways analysis is often charged with ideological claims. Rogoff and Reinhart presented the idea that when a country's ratio of debt to gross domestic product reaches 90% lower economic growth is on the horizon. This idea has been extremely influential in shaping austerity policies in the US but also in the Eurozone. A new study by Herdon et al (2013) finds that Rogoff and Reinhart made several mistakes that invalidate their thesis.[1] Reinhart and Rogoff admitted their bad calculation but denied claims that the errors were made intentionally. Certainly, judging if the mistake was intentional or not matters but it is hard to determine. What appears though of greater importance is the dialectic between scientific and ideological claims. In their response, Rogoff and Reinhart maintain that their main thesis, that there is a causal relationship between depth ratio and economic growth, although based on a false calculation is still relevant. But acknowledging this causal relationship seems to steam out of ideological beliefs rather than science. As Krugman showcases in a recent blog, countries ran up high debts as a consequence of their growth slowdowns, not the other way around.[2]
Obviously the above causality matters in terms of policy making: if slow growth is the result of high depth then the austerity policies pursued in the Eurozone and the US make sense. If on the other hand, slow growth is attributed to other factors then increasing public depth might be a tactic to combat slow growth. In both scenarios, the answer is not clear. In that sense, Shulock’s claim that policy analysis already involves discourse, introduces ideas into politics, and affects policy outcomes. But it does so in a very different way while posing an important question: Is the role of the policy analyst, expert or academic impartial or one that should acknowledge ideological underpinnings? At the same time, does recognizing the potential bias in policy analysis will enhance the power of analysis of the discipline or would it blurry further its role into the policy decision making process? Certainly, answering these questions is far from obvious. Perhaps a redefinition of what is policy analysis is required to do so. In that sense, the problem shifts from the policy analysis as a discipline and becomes an issue of how we perceive policy analysis and its role. If we view policy analysis as the guide to the right solution amongst different alternatives then Rogoff and Reinhart do bear enormous responsibility for influencing and ultimately shaping policy decisions. If on the other hand, we perceive policy analysis as a laboratory of ideas, then Rogoff and Reinhart’s mistake suddenly becomes less important as we account for the ideological bias within their argument. While a shift towards the second definition will result in a loss of credibility for many of the solutions advanced through policy analysis, it will nevertheless acknowledge the non-neutral ideas and assumptions accompanying it.
References
Krugman, Paul, 2013. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/reinhart-rogoff-continued/
Rogoff and Reinhart. 2012. “Growth in a Time of Dept.” National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Shedlock, Mike. 2013. Excel Spreadsheets, Krugman, and a Question of Logic.
Shulock, Nancy, “The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18(2), 1999.
[1] They made a spreadsheet error that resulted in their leaving five countries out of an all-important average of countries with higher than 90% debt-to-GDP ratios. By restoring the full average, the UMass authors say, the growth rate for countries in that range becomes 2.2%, not the -0.1% cited by Rogoff and Reinhart (Shedlock, 2013).
[2] http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/reinhart-rogoff-continued/
Shulock (2003) provides an interesting insight to the question above when she argues that:
“The problem, is only that policy analysts, policymakers, and observers alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. Policy analysis has changed, right along with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse that shapes citizen preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political environment.” (p. 240). Under this view, policy analysis has a larger than what we usually perceive role. It is less rational-objective, although it provides the “appearance” of rationality, and more ideologically biased; in that sense, it does not provide solutions to problems but it becomes a weapon in the battle to shape debate, claim jurisdiction, and gain public approval of legislative activity.
Perhaps the recent story on the influential paper by Ken Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart
“Growth in a Time of Debt” can shed further light on the ways policy making is influenced by analysis but also on the ways analysis is often charged with ideological claims. Rogoff and Reinhart presented the idea that when a country's ratio of debt to gross domestic product reaches 90% lower economic growth is on the horizon. This idea has been extremely influential in shaping austerity policies in the US but also in the Eurozone. A new study by Herdon et al (2013) finds that Rogoff and Reinhart made several mistakes that invalidate their thesis.[1] Reinhart and Rogoff admitted their bad calculation but denied claims that the errors were made intentionally. Certainly, judging if the mistake was intentional or not matters but it is hard to determine. What appears though of greater importance is the dialectic between scientific and ideological claims. In their response, Rogoff and Reinhart maintain that their main thesis, that there is a causal relationship between depth ratio and economic growth, although based on a false calculation is still relevant. But acknowledging this causal relationship seems to steam out of ideological beliefs rather than science. As Krugman showcases in a recent blog, countries ran up high debts as a consequence of their growth slowdowns, not the other way around.[2]
Obviously the above causality matters in terms of policy making: if slow growth is the result of high depth then the austerity policies pursued in the Eurozone and the US make sense. If on the other hand, slow growth is attributed to other factors then increasing public depth might be a tactic to combat slow growth. In both scenarios, the answer is not clear. In that sense, Shulock’s claim that policy analysis already involves discourse, introduces ideas into politics, and affects policy outcomes. But it does so in a very different way while posing an important question: Is the role of the policy analyst, expert or academic impartial or one that should acknowledge ideological underpinnings? At the same time, does recognizing the potential bias in policy analysis will enhance the power of analysis of the discipline or would it blurry further its role into the policy decision making process? Certainly, answering these questions is far from obvious. Perhaps a redefinition of what is policy analysis is required to do so. In that sense, the problem shifts from the policy analysis as a discipline and becomes an issue of how we perceive policy analysis and its role. If we view policy analysis as the guide to the right solution amongst different alternatives then Rogoff and Reinhart do bear enormous responsibility for influencing and ultimately shaping policy decisions. If on the other hand, we perceive policy analysis as a laboratory of ideas, then Rogoff and Reinhart’s mistake suddenly becomes less important as we account for the ideological bias within their argument. While a shift towards the second definition will result in a loss of credibility for many of the solutions advanced through policy analysis, it will nevertheless acknowledge the non-neutral ideas and assumptions accompanying it.
References
Krugman, Paul, 2013. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/reinhart-rogoff-continued/
Rogoff and Reinhart. 2012. “Growth in a Time of Dept.” National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Shedlock, Mike. 2013. Excel Spreadsheets, Krugman, and a Question of Logic.
Shulock, Nancy, “The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18(2), 1999.
[1] They made a spreadsheet error that resulted in their leaving five countries out of an all-important average of countries with higher than 90% debt-to-GDP ratios. By restoring the full average, the UMass authors say, the growth rate for countries in that range becomes 2.2%, not the -0.1% cited by Rogoff and Reinhart (Shedlock, 2013).
[2] http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/reinhart-rogoff-continued/
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