Policy literature and analysis have been primarily interested in understanding the various steps of the policy process. From the identification of a specific issue, the inception of a particular policy, its implementation and outcomes, the analysis of the policy stages tends to focus on a macro-level. But what seems to be often missing from such analyses is how an actual policy is implemented on the micro scale, at the day-to-day basis. Indeed, in most cases, the way policies are implemented has a lot to do with the bureaucratic realities that are often unrelated to the actual policy. Under this view, one can argue that – at least to a certain extent - policy implementation is determined by policy interpretation. This interpretation process is not undertaken at a high-level decision-making, but usually performed at the lower levels of the bureaucratic machine. It is at this critical stage and through the frictions between policy implementers and citizens that a particular policy gets tested for the first time, not so much in terms of its expected outcomes but more so in terms of its feasibility and responsiveness to a particular situation, population, city or state. In that sense, policies are often adapted to reflect the realities on the ground, which are omitted through previous stages of the policy process. In many regards, successful adaptation can lead to successful implementation but not necessarily to successful outcomes.
Lipsky (1980) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), reveal the intricacies related with street bureaucracy and policy implementation. For Lipsky, street-level bureaucrats often work in situations too complicated to reduce to programmatic formats, under conditions that often require responses to the human dimensions of situations (1980:15). Under these conditions, the frictions between the policy’s stated objectives and the actual application of a given policy can create situations where interpretation is solely based on the street bureaucrat or on a given authority. Perhaps the EDA employment program in Oakland stumbled across these interpretational frictions; while the objective was to raise employment, the implementing authority and street-level bureaucracy (if we take the freedom to consider EDA as such) instead of taking the direct path of paying the employers a subsidy on wages after they have hired minority personnel, expanded their capital on the promise that they would later hire the right people. For Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) the difficulties in achieving the actual outcomes (increased employment opportunities for minorities) were rooted on the organizational tradition of EDA. One can also argue that such difficulties were enhanced through EDA’s misreading of important realities in Oakland, namely the city’s transition from a manufacturing to a service center and the disconnect between unemployed manufacturing labor force and service seeking employees jobs.
But certainly Oakland’s example reveals a more general misconception in terms of policy implementation. For instance, in many cities facing a housing problem, housing programs often do not manage to fulfill their objectives as subsidies are designed in such a way that the intended beneficiaries do not benefit from the program. An extensive literature on slum upgrading describes various cases were subsidies were captured by contractors or higher income segments of the city’s population instead of the intended low-income dwellers. In post-Apartheid South Africa housing became a constitutional right with the government under the obligation to provide these rights “within reasonable means”. This constitutional amendment was realized through a generous housing policy that was implemented in order to fulfill the residential backlog. But the generous housing subsidies (reaching $15,000 per household) were often captured by middle-income citizens and usually not by the intended beneficiaries who were the poorest citizens. Paradoxically, a housing policy aiming to erase inequalities based on Apartheid has, through its implementation, perpetuated inequality. On the long run, the South African government has spend important amounts with the perverse effect of reinforcing the spatial logic of apartheid and by continuing to settle poor (and almost entirely non-white) communities on the periphery of cities, missing a great opportunity to break down racial segregation and economic marginalization.
The example above raises an important question: what is the role of the street level bureaucrat? In other words, can this process of policy interpretation as performed by street bureaucracies correct for the fallacies within the macro-level decision making of a policy. Certainly an answer to these questions varies on a case-by-case basis. But what seems quite clear is that although the leverage and influence that street bureaucrats might have depends on specific situations, their role as state representatives and actual implementers provides them with important insights on how an actual policy could perform. In that sense, street bureaucracy offers the “bridge” between policy makers and citizens. If understood as such, street bureaucracy can create better connections between the macro-level and the day to day of policy decisions.
References
Lipsky, Michael, Street Level Bureaucracy, Russell Sage Foundation, 1980.
Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation, University of California Press, 1984.
Lipsky (1980) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), reveal the intricacies related with street bureaucracy and policy implementation. For Lipsky, street-level bureaucrats often work in situations too complicated to reduce to programmatic formats, under conditions that often require responses to the human dimensions of situations (1980:15). Under these conditions, the frictions between the policy’s stated objectives and the actual application of a given policy can create situations where interpretation is solely based on the street bureaucrat or on a given authority. Perhaps the EDA employment program in Oakland stumbled across these interpretational frictions; while the objective was to raise employment, the implementing authority and street-level bureaucracy (if we take the freedom to consider EDA as such) instead of taking the direct path of paying the employers a subsidy on wages after they have hired minority personnel, expanded their capital on the promise that they would later hire the right people. For Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) the difficulties in achieving the actual outcomes (increased employment opportunities for minorities) were rooted on the organizational tradition of EDA. One can also argue that such difficulties were enhanced through EDA’s misreading of important realities in Oakland, namely the city’s transition from a manufacturing to a service center and the disconnect between unemployed manufacturing labor force and service seeking employees jobs.
But certainly Oakland’s example reveals a more general misconception in terms of policy implementation. For instance, in many cities facing a housing problem, housing programs often do not manage to fulfill their objectives as subsidies are designed in such a way that the intended beneficiaries do not benefit from the program. An extensive literature on slum upgrading describes various cases were subsidies were captured by contractors or higher income segments of the city’s population instead of the intended low-income dwellers. In post-Apartheid South Africa housing became a constitutional right with the government under the obligation to provide these rights “within reasonable means”. This constitutional amendment was realized through a generous housing policy that was implemented in order to fulfill the residential backlog. But the generous housing subsidies (reaching $15,000 per household) were often captured by middle-income citizens and usually not by the intended beneficiaries who were the poorest citizens. Paradoxically, a housing policy aiming to erase inequalities based on Apartheid has, through its implementation, perpetuated inequality. On the long run, the South African government has spend important amounts with the perverse effect of reinforcing the spatial logic of apartheid and by continuing to settle poor (and almost entirely non-white) communities on the periphery of cities, missing a great opportunity to break down racial segregation and economic marginalization.
The example above raises an important question: what is the role of the street level bureaucrat? In other words, can this process of policy interpretation as performed by street bureaucracies correct for the fallacies within the macro-level decision making of a policy. Certainly an answer to these questions varies on a case-by-case basis. But what seems quite clear is that although the leverage and influence that street bureaucrats might have depends on specific situations, their role as state representatives and actual implementers provides them with important insights on how an actual policy could perform. In that sense, street bureaucracy offers the “bridge” between policy makers and citizens. If understood as such, street bureaucracy can create better connections between the macro-level and the day to day of policy decisions.
References
Lipsky, Michael, Street Level Bureaucracy, Russell Sage Foundation, 1980.
Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation, University of California Press, 1984.
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