By Claude Joseph
Almost four decades ago, casinos were legal in only Nevada. Now, in one form or another, gambling is legal in every state except Hawaii and Utah (GAO, 2007). Casinos have expanded to the extent that the vast majority of Americans now have relatively access to one because they live within a three-to four-hour drive of a casino (Grinold & Mustard, 2004). This short essay is an attempt to shed light on the diffusion of legalized gambling across the American states in using appropriate existing theoretical frameworks.
Countless studies (Drezer, 2001; Grossback et. al., 2004; Meseguer, 2006) show that policy diffusion, defined as “the spread of policies or institutions across regions or globally”), does occur. Countries do not devise policies exclusively because of environmental pressure, policy choices of some countries are indeed influenced by others. However, coming to grips with what drives policy diffusion constitutes a contentious ground among scholars. While for some, the determinant of policy diffusion is transnational forces namely international financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank, others stick to the realist paradigm that states, despite the power of globalization, still have agency to enact policies. The state-oriented approach, in turn, is split into two categories. One, the constructivist approach, explains domestic initiative by a sort of symbolism, a desire to impress global opinion concerning a government capacity to innovate. The other, a goal oriented/problem-solving approach, argues that policy diffusion occurs because states pursue their self-interest. Wayland, for example, is not only subscribed to a state-centered paradigm, but also contends that policy diffusion is more likely to occur across neighbouring countries rather than globally. The reason is that governments are unable to scan the entire global environment; they instead use inferential shortcuts to search for good policies. To uphold his bounded learning framework, he uses the Chilean-style privatization. This argument, however, is challenged by Grossback et. al. (2004) who show that ideology (particular a sort of liberal-conservative divide) has more explanatory power than Wayland’s contiguity theory.
In this essay, I use the race-to-the-bottom (RTB) argument along with the bounded learning assumptions to explain the diffusion of legalized gambling across the American states.
Legalized gambling does, according to many, reduce budget deficit, and pay for important programs from public works to public education (Skolnik, 2011). These benefits are deemed to be in the public interest because they have positive impact on poor communities. From 1985 through June 1999, about $900 million of casino community reinvestment funds had been earmarked for community investment in Atlantic City including housing, road improvements, and casino hotel room expansion projects (GAO, 2000). As a result, state-level officials are turning to gambling as an economic cure-all and clamouring for more gambling in their respective states. A second related rationale for more gambling is that people from a state with no gambling will gamble in the proximate one that has legalized gambling. According to this perspective, states that do not legalize gambling will be economically left behind. This, consequently, leads to a race-to-the-bottom.
Our second assumption concerns the way a state, say Pennsylvania, learns about New Jersey gambling policy. To me, the former does legalize gambling not because a meticulous study that weighed the costs and benefits of gambling had been conducted on the policy enacted by the latter. Rather Pennsylvania’s policymakers, because of time constraints and insufficient information, use cognitive heuristics to make inference about the advantages and the side effects of gambling. I must also acknowledge that policy makers that form what Daniel Drezner dubs “epistemic community” are also influenced by pro- and anti-gambling lobbies – an issue that reinforces the explanatory power of bounded learning approach.
Comment
This is interesting. Policy diffusion seems to be a simple term that attempts to describe a very complex form of policy process. Sure, gambling may be in every state now. But what about issues of quality? What is the level of partnership between state government and American Indian tribes in states? Is the type of gambling similar or different between certain states? What's the consequence of the spread of gambling on economic and social well being of residents?Jermaine
Almost four decades ago, casinos were legal in only Nevada. Now, in one form or another, gambling is legal in every state except Hawaii and Utah (GAO, 2007). Casinos have expanded to the extent that the vast majority of Americans now have relatively access to one because they live within a three-to four-hour drive of a casino (Grinold & Mustard, 2004). This short essay is an attempt to shed light on the diffusion of legalized gambling across the American states in using appropriate existing theoretical frameworks.
Countless studies (Drezer, 2001; Grossback et. al., 2004; Meseguer, 2006) show that policy diffusion, defined as “the spread of policies or institutions across regions or globally”), does occur. Countries do not devise policies exclusively because of environmental pressure, policy choices of some countries are indeed influenced by others. However, coming to grips with what drives policy diffusion constitutes a contentious ground among scholars. While for some, the determinant of policy diffusion is transnational forces namely international financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank, others stick to the realist paradigm that states, despite the power of globalization, still have agency to enact policies. The state-oriented approach, in turn, is split into two categories. One, the constructivist approach, explains domestic initiative by a sort of symbolism, a desire to impress global opinion concerning a government capacity to innovate. The other, a goal oriented/problem-solving approach, argues that policy diffusion occurs because states pursue their self-interest. Wayland, for example, is not only subscribed to a state-centered paradigm, but also contends that policy diffusion is more likely to occur across neighbouring countries rather than globally. The reason is that governments are unable to scan the entire global environment; they instead use inferential shortcuts to search for good policies. To uphold his bounded learning framework, he uses the Chilean-style privatization. This argument, however, is challenged by Grossback et. al. (2004) who show that ideology (particular a sort of liberal-conservative divide) has more explanatory power than Wayland’s contiguity theory.
In this essay, I use the race-to-the-bottom (RTB) argument along with the bounded learning assumptions to explain the diffusion of legalized gambling across the American states.
Legalized gambling does, according to many, reduce budget deficit, and pay for important programs from public works to public education (Skolnik, 2011). These benefits are deemed to be in the public interest because they have positive impact on poor communities. From 1985 through June 1999, about $900 million of casino community reinvestment funds had been earmarked for community investment in Atlantic City including housing, road improvements, and casino hotel room expansion projects (GAO, 2000). As a result, state-level officials are turning to gambling as an economic cure-all and clamouring for more gambling in their respective states. A second related rationale for more gambling is that people from a state with no gambling will gamble in the proximate one that has legalized gambling. According to this perspective, states that do not legalize gambling will be economically left behind. This, consequently, leads to a race-to-the-bottom.
Our second assumption concerns the way a state, say Pennsylvania, learns about New Jersey gambling policy. To me, the former does legalize gambling not because a meticulous study that weighed the costs and benefits of gambling had been conducted on the policy enacted by the latter. Rather Pennsylvania’s policymakers, because of time constraints and insufficient information, use cognitive heuristics to make inference about the advantages and the side effects of gambling. I must also acknowledge that policy makers that form what Daniel Drezner dubs “epistemic community” are also influenced by pro- and anti-gambling lobbies – an issue that reinforces the explanatory power of bounded learning approach.
Comment
This is interesting. Policy diffusion seems to be a simple term that attempts to describe a very complex form of policy process. Sure, gambling may be in every state now. But what about issues of quality? What is the level of partnership between state government and American Indian tribes in states? Is the type of gambling similar or different between certain states? What's the consequence of the spread of gambling on economic and social well being of residents?Jermaine
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