Zoé Hamstead
Since before the New Year, a major issue dominating the news cycle in the United States has been the federal budget crisis. Relatedly, the failure of Congress to reach a budget deal, the Obama administration’s failure to effectively lead policymakers toward a compromise, and the resulting furloughs that affect numerous national programs and related jobs have been blamed primarily on political conflict and the extreme differences in the two parties’ ideologies with respect to federal spending. Far less discussion has focused on how organizational behavior within the governing bodies is related to the challenges they have faced over the last months. Allison and Zelikow (1999) describe major differences among governmental behavior models, including the Rational Actor Model (RAM), model of Governmental Politics and organizational behavior model. These perspectives can be used to contrast the different explanations for why the budget process has thus far failed.
In the RAM framework, government action is seen as the result of choice by government agents. Within the context of international decisionmaking, Allison and Zelikow describe the actor within the RAM framework as a unified national government. However, in the case of national-level budget decisions, we would need to allow for multiple decision makers within the United States government, such as the Senate and the House, each unified around a separate federal spending ideology. Generally speaking, Senate Democrats would like to close budget gaps by eliminating tax loopholes that benefit corporations and wealthy Americans, while House Republicans would like to cut spending. The parties’ unwillingness to compromise is by perceived by each as their most strategic alternative. In other words, for each party, immediate spending furloughs are preferable to alternatives proposed by the other side. This perhaps simplified version of a cost benefit analysis has led to Congressional gridlock and across-the-board budget slashing.
By contrast, within the governmental politics framework, government behavior is viewed as the result of bargaining games. The government politics model would explain Congress’s failure to reach a budget agreement as a result of failed bargaining. Obama has been blamed for not sufficiently reaching across the aisle during the last four years in order to form relationships and norms of compromise with Republicans in Congress. In addition, constituents and interest groups have been very hard on Republicans who are seen as cooperative with the President. For example, Charlie Crist, former Republican governor of Florida and Governor Chris Christie have faced harsh political consequences for cooperating with the White House Administration and praising the President. Political commentators have suggested that cooperation with Mr. Obama on the budget deal could jeopardize Representative Boehner’s leadership position in the House, as well as Mr. McConnell’s Senate seat (Calmes, 2013). Meanwhile, Senate Democrats may be unwilling to propose policy that would be politically unpopular within the party. These potential political consequences, coupled with Mr. Obama’s inability to sufficiently engage republicans have set the stage for unsuccessful bargaining.
Finally, the organizational behavior model interprets government behavior as the result of patterns of behavior that are embedded within the institutional framework of organizations. This theoretical model is more difficult to apply to the budget crisis because some patterns of behavior that come into play during national budget negotiations are formed over a relatively short time period, which is linked to the election cycles of Congress. However, one could argue that “standard operating procedures” established over the last four years have meant that the Senate and House work on bills separately (Peters, 2013). Molding a unified national policy from two widely divergent proposals has been – to put it lightly – unsuccessful. Congress has developed patterns of interaction within and between both the two parties and the two congressional bodies. The Obama Administration’s attempt at new outreach efforts across the aisle are being undertaken in order to change the uncooperative pattern of behavior in the Senate (Peters, 2013), though this strategy may come too late for budget compromise.
Each of these perspectives contributes something to an explanation of why the budget decision has been characterized by gridlock. Although the political and RAM frameworks are perhaps more compelling in this case than the organizational behavior model, the latter may provide insight that is more useful in changing the course of future decisionmaking because decision makers may have more influence over patterns of behavior within decisionmaking bodies than over general political will or a political opponent’s ideology.
References
Allison, G., & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Addison-Wesley Education Publishers Inc.
Calmes, J. (2013, March 11). In President’s Outreach to G.O.P., Past Failures Loom. The New York Times. New York, NY. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/us/politics/obamas-gop-outreach-hits-barriers.html?ref=us
Peters, J. W. (2013, March 11). House and Senate Work Simultaneously to Create Budgets, a Rarity. The New York Times. New York, NY. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/us/politics/house-and-senate-work-simultaneously-to-create-budgets.html?ref=us&_r=0
Since before the New Year, a major issue dominating the news cycle in the United States has been the federal budget crisis. Relatedly, the failure of Congress to reach a budget deal, the Obama administration’s failure to effectively lead policymakers toward a compromise, and the resulting furloughs that affect numerous national programs and related jobs have been blamed primarily on political conflict and the extreme differences in the two parties’ ideologies with respect to federal spending. Far less discussion has focused on how organizational behavior within the governing bodies is related to the challenges they have faced over the last months. Allison and Zelikow (1999) describe major differences among governmental behavior models, including the Rational Actor Model (RAM), model of Governmental Politics and organizational behavior model. These perspectives can be used to contrast the different explanations for why the budget process has thus far failed.
In the RAM framework, government action is seen as the result of choice by government agents. Within the context of international decisionmaking, Allison and Zelikow describe the actor within the RAM framework as a unified national government. However, in the case of national-level budget decisions, we would need to allow for multiple decision makers within the United States government, such as the Senate and the House, each unified around a separate federal spending ideology. Generally speaking, Senate Democrats would like to close budget gaps by eliminating tax loopholes that benefit corporations and wealthy Americans, while House Republicans would like to cut spending. The parties’ unwillingness to compromise is by perceived by each as their most strategic alternative. In other words, for each party, immediate spending furloughs are preferable to alternatives proposed by the other side. This perhaps simplified version of a cost benefit analysis has led to Congressional gridlock and across-the-board budget slashing.
By contrast, within the governmental politics framework, government behavior is viewed as the result of bargaining games. The government politics model would explain Congress’s failure to reach a budget agreement as a result of failed bargaining. Obama has been blamed for not sufficiently reaching across the aisle during the last four years in order to form relationships and norms of compromise with Republicans in Congress. In addition, constituents and interest groups have been very hard on Republicans who are seen as cooperative with the President. For example, Charlie Crist, former Republican governor of Florida and Governor Chris Christie have faced harsh political consequences for cooperating with the White House Administration and praising the President. Political commentators have suggested that cooperation with Mr. Obama on the budget deal could jeopardize Representative Boehner’s leadership position in the House, as well as Mr. McConnell’s Senate seat (Calmes, 2013). Meanwhile, Senate Democrats may be unwilling to propose policy that would be politically unpopular within the party. These potential political consequences, coupled with Mr. Obama’s inability to sufficiently engage republicans have set the stage for unsuccessful bargaining.
Finally, the organizational behavior model interprets government behavior as the result of patterns of behavior that are embedded within the institutional framework of organizations. This theoretical model is more difficult to apply to the budget crisis because some patterns of behavior that come into play during national budget negotiations are formed over a relatively short time period, which is linked to the election cycles of Congress. However, one could argue that “standard operating procedures” established over the last four years have meant that the Senate and House work on bills separately (Peters, 2013). Molding a unified national policy from two widely divergent proposals has been – to put it lightly – unsuccessful. Congress has developed patterns of interaction within and between both the two parties and the two congressional bodies. The Obama Administration’s attempt at new outreach efforts across the aisle are being undertaken in order to change the uncooperative pattern of behavior in the Senate (Peters, 2013), though this strategy may come too late for budget compromise.
Each of these perspectives contributes something to an explanation of why the budget decision has been characterized by gridlock. Although the political and RAM frameworks are perhaps more compelling in this case than the organizational behavior model, the latter may provide insight that is more useful in changing the course of future decisionmaking because decision makers may have more influence over patterns of behavior within decisionmaking bodies than over general political will or a political opponent’s ideology.
References
Allison, G., & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Addison-Wesley Education Publishers Inc.
Calmes, J. (2013, March 11). In President’s Outreach to G.O.P., Past Failures Loom. The New York Times. New York, NY. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/us/politics/obamas-gop-outreach-hits-barriers.html?ref=us
Peters, J. W. (2013, March 11). House and Senate Work Simultaneously to Create Budgets, a Rarity. The New York Times. New York, NY. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/us/politics/house-and-senate-work-simultaneously-to-create-budgets.html?ref=us&_r=0
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