By Claude Joseph
In her book Policy Paradox, Deborah Stone endeavors to go over some key concepts in policy sciences with a fine-tooth comb. Indeed, she succeeds where many others fail. Through interesting illustrations, she adroitly explains concepts such as equity, efficiency, and liberty, which have oftentimes been presented in a very arcane way. But the bulk of the book resides in her attempts to differentiate the market from what she calls the polis.
In the market, it is argued, individuals are self-interested and each person looks out for herself regardless of the consequences of her actions on the welfare of others. In the market model, as Stone argues, individuals act only to maximize their own self-interest. In order for everyone to achieve the utmost of his/her actions in the marketplace, people must compete against each other; and consequently, social cohesion will be reached through the market process by a sort of aggregation of individual self-interests. As Smith (1776) argues, “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.” In the polis, however, prevails a different landscape featured by, among others, loyalty, cooperation and public interest. In the polis, the public interest should not be equated with self-interest; it is rather “those things that the public-spirited side desires”
My question – which I borrow from the public choice literature – is why should the man in the market be different from the man in the polis? It makes real sense to wonder, as Tullock et al. (2005) do, why should we assume a bifurcated view of human behavior, which consists of a self-interested one in the marketplace and a public-spirited side in the polis. Why should, for instance, we believe that a man or a woman who has been driven by self-interested motives in his/her market transactions would suddenly change once decided to serve the polis?
The median voter approach, despite its shortcomings, provides an interesting insight concerning the behavior of politicians who want to maximize their reelection prospect. They lie and they cheat. Tullock et al. (2005) are blunt: “just as a businessperson designs the latest automobile to attract customers, the politician selects policies with the idea that the customer, who is the voter, will reward the politician in the next election” (p. 6). They all fight to attract the median voter. Ideological stance and conviction are put aside.
Actually, Mitt Romney is a blatant example. In the republican primary, governor Romney has fought hard to conquer the heart of the most conservative people. For all issues that are dear to conservative republicans, the governor was more than ready to bring them into the institutional agenda if he is elected as president, but more specifically if he is selected by his own party as the candidate. As it happens, Romney aced the primary and ironically when debating Obama for the first time people where surprised to see how Romney was flip-flopping around social and economic issues for which he was crystal clear in the primary. The vote of the undecided, and even the democrats unsatisfied with Obama’s performances, was henceforth Romney concerns in the second round.
Thus, likewise actions make it hard to believe that the man in the market is different from the man in the polis. All seems to use strategies that they deem are likely to maximize their self-interest, be it reelection prospects or other economic utilities.
In her book Policy Paradox, Deborah Stone endeavors to go over some key concepts in policy sciences with a fine-tooth comb. Indeed, she succeeds where many others fail. Through interesting illustrations, she adroitly explains concepts such as equity, efficiency, and liberty, which have oftentimes been presented in a very arcane way. But the bulk of the book resides in her attempts to differentiate the market from what she calls the polis.
In the market, it is argued, individuals are self-interested and each person looks out for herself regardless of the consequences of her actions on the welfare of others. In the market model, as Stone argues, individuals act only to maximize their own self-interest. In order for everyone to achieve the utmost of his/her actions in the marketplace, people must compete against each other; and consequently, social cohesion will be reached through the market process by a sort of aggregation of individual self-interests. As Smith (1776) argues, “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.” In the polis, however, prevails a different landscape featured by, among others, loyalty, cooperation and public interest. In the polis, the public interest should not be equated with self-interest; it is rather “those things that the public-spirited side desires”
My question – which I borrow from the public choice literature – is why should the man in the market be different from the man in the polis? It makes real sense to wonder, as Tullock et al. (2005) do, why should we assume a bifurcated view of human behavior, which consists of a self-interested one in the marketplace and a public-spirited side in the polis. Why should, for instance, we believe that a man or a woman who has been driven by self-interested motives in his/her market transactions would suddenly change once decided to serve the polis?
The median voter approach, despite its shortcomings, provides an interesting insight concerning the behavior of politicians who want to maximize their reelection prospect. They lie and they cheat. Tullock et al. (2005) are blunt: “just as a businessperson designs the latest automobile to attract customers, the politician selects policies with the idea that the customer, who is the voter, will reward the politician in the next election” (p. 6). They all fight to attract the median voter. Ideological stance and conviction are put aside.
Actually, Mitt Romney is a blatant example. In the republican primary, governor Romney has fought hard to conquer the heart of the most conservative people. For all issues that are dear to conservative republicans, the governor was more than ready to bring them into the institutional agenda if he is elected as president, but more specifically if he is selected by his own party as the candidate. As it happens, Romney aced the primary and ironically when debating Obama for the first time people where surprised to see how Romney was flip-flopping around social and economic issues for which he was crystal clear in the primary. The vote of the undecided, and even the democrats unsatisfied with Obama’s performances, was henceforth Romney concerns in the second round.
Thus, likewise actions make it hard to believe that the man in the market is different from the man in the polis. All seems to use strategies that they deem are likely to maximize their self-interest, be it reelection prospects or other economic utilities.
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