Lowi (1975), writes, “Regulation is obviously only one of several ways governments seek to control society and individual conduct.” Public policies seek to define and set a moral and procedural agenda for societal conduct, with government commitment serving as the centerpiece of implementation. According to the rational model, individuals pursue only their self-interested agendas, without moral or ethical considerations for the greater community or public good. Implied in this definition is that it is the role of government to increase societal equity via policymaking.
Sometimes, however, this paradigm is turned on its head as policymakers are caught between supporting policies that increase equity and acting in their own political self-interest. This conflict between policy and policymaker might constitute a new dimension of the equity-efficiency tradeoff debate long central to policy discussions. What may be equitable may not be the most efficient or popular choice for the policymaker in terms of their own interests.
2013 is an election year in New York City, and in a tight challenging primary race amongst democrats, City Council Speaker Christine Quinn has earned the tenuous position of front-runner, as a strong advocate for middle-class and low-income families. However, currently, using her position as Speaker, Quinn is blocking a bill that would require employers to provide five paid sick-days per year to employees. Despite the bill’s overwhelming support from City Council members, with 37 co-sponsors out of 51 council members, it “faces stiff opposition from business groups, whose support Ms. Quinn has assiduously courted” (Gyrnbaum, 2013).
Quinn faces a challenging policy paradox, wherein the articulated political agenda of her party and her campaign do not match with her own interest in winning the mayoral election this fall. If she allows the bill to come to a vote, and thus be passed, assuming the 37 council members in favor maintain their position, she risks losing the financial and political support of business groups. Meanwhile, by not allowing the Sick Days Bill to come to a vote, she has stirred opposition from women within her own party and from prominent advocates, who highlight the importance of this legislation for working women with children.
The voice of women in the debate around this bill is particularly important not only because of the rights mandated by the legislation, but because Quinn is the only females candidate and could be the first female mayor of New York City. Quinn’s position not only within her political community (adherence to party “rules” and causes) but also within her cultural community (shared culture, moral codes) is being called into question. Prominent women’s rights advocate Gloria Steinem released a statement saying that she viewed the passage of the sick-leave legislation as more significant than electing the first female mayor of New York City, saying, “Making life fairer for all women seems more important than breaking a barrier for one woman” (Gyrnbaum, 2013).
As Stone (2012) writes in her introductory discussion of “the market and the polis,” interest groups influence and drive policymaking (29). In this case Quinn’s attempts to navigate between the desires of two interest groups that have opposing agendas has illuminated the conflict embedded within her position as a pro-women, pro-families policymaker, and an ally of business interests. For Quinn, it seemed at first that it might be most efficient to simply not allow the Sick Days Bill to come to a vote, perhaps with the assumption that if the bill was not given the floor it would languish and loss political momentum. This scenario would mean that Quinn could avoid making explicit her support of the business community’s agenda, which is in direct conflict with the equity-promoting principles of her campaign platform.
Instead, blocking the Council from voting on the bill has had the opposite affect, drawing perhaps unanticipated vocal opposition from other policymakers and advocates who support pro-women, pro-families legislation (and who are surely capitalizing on the momentum of the controversy). They have become what Wilson (1989) calls a “hostile interest group” (77). Now, a conflict between working families and businesses inherent in Quinn’s political agenda has been brought to light, and she may lose the support of both interest groups. Her agency as Council Speaker has become a liability.
Resources:
“15+ women elected officials call on Speaker Quinn to bring Paid Sick Days Bill to vote.” February 25, 2013. http://nycforpaidsickdays.org/release-women-electeds-call-for-paid-sick-days-demand-action-from-quinn/
Grynbaum, Michael. “Steinem’s Support for Quinn as Mayor Depends on Sick-Leave Bill.” The New York Times. February 20, 2013. Lowi, Theodore J., “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics, 16(4), 1964. Stone, Deborah, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, 3rd Edition, WW Norton, 2012.
Wilson, James Q., Chapter 5: “Interests” in Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, BasicBooks, 1989.
Sometimes, however, this paradigm is turned on its head as policymakers are caught between supporting policies that increase equity and acting in their own political self-interest. This conflict between policy and policymaker might constitute a new dimension of the equity-efficiency tradeoff debate long central to policy discussions. What may be equitable may not be the most efficient or popular choice for the policymaker in terms of their own interests.
2013 is an election year in New York City, and in a tight challenging primary race amongst democrats, City Council Speaker Christine Quinn has earned the tenuous position of front-runner, as a strong advocate for middle-class and low-income families. However, currently, using her position as Speaker, Quinn is blocking a bill that would require employers to provide five paid sick-days per year to employees. Despite the bill’s overwhelming support from City Council members, with 37 co-sponsors out of 51 council members, it “faces stiff opposition from business groups, whose support Ms. Quinn has assiduously courted” (Gyrnbaum, 2013).
Quinn faces a challenging policy paradox, wherein the articulated political agenda of her party and her campaign do not match with her own interest in winning the mayoral election this fall. If she allows the bill to come to a vote, and thus be passed, assuming the 37 council members in favor maintain their position, she risks losing the financial and political support of business groups. Meanwhile, by not allowing the Sick Days Bill to come to a vote, she has stirred opposition from women within her own party and from prominent advocates, who highlight the importance of this legislation for working women with children.
The voice of women in the debate around this bill is particularly important not only because of the rights mandated by the legislation, but because Quinn is the only females candidate and could be the first female mayor of New York City. Quinn’s position not only within her political community (adherence to party “rules” and causes) but also within her cultural community (shared culture, moral codes) is being called into question. Prominent women’s rights advocate Gloria Steinem released a statement saying that she viewed the passage of the sick-leave legislation as more significant than electing the first female mayor of New York City, saying, “Making life fairer for all women seems more important than breaking a barrier for one woman” (Gyrnbaum, 2013).
As Stone (2012) writes in her introductory discussion of “the market and the polis,” interest groups influence and drive policymaking (29). In this case Quinn’s attempts to navigate between the desires of two interest groups that have opposing agendas has illuminated the conflict embedded within her position as a pro-women, pro-families policymaker, and an ally of business interests. For Quinn, it seemed at first that it might be most efficient to simply not allow the Sick Days Bill to come to a vote, perhaps with the assumption that if the bill was not given the floor it would languish and loss political momentum. This scenario would mean that Quinn could avoid making explicit her support of the business community’s agenda, which is in direct conflict with the equity-promoting principles of her campaign platform.
Instead, blocking the Council from voting on the bill has had the opposite affect, drawing perhaps unanticipated vocal opposition from other policymakers and advocates who support pro-women, pro-families legislation (and who are surely capitalizing on the momentum of the controversy). They have become what Wilson (1989) calls a “hostile interest group” (77). Now, a conflict between working families and businesses inherent in Quinn’s political agenda has been brought to light, and she may lose the support of both interest groups. Her agency as Council Speaker has become a liability.
Resources:
“15+ women elected officials call on Speaker Quinn to bring Paid Sick Days Bill to vote.” February 25, 2013. http://nycforpaidsickdays.org/release-women-electeds-call-for-paid-sick-days-demand-action-from-quinn/
Grynbaum, Michael. “Steinem’s Support for Quinn as Mayor Depends on Sick-Leave Bill.” The New York Times. February 20, 2013. Lowi, Theodore J., “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics, 16(4), 1964. Stone, Deborah, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, 3rd Edition, WW Norton, 2012.
Wilson, James Q., Chapter 5: “Interests” in Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, BasicBooks, 1989.
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