Andrea

The disconnect between theories and models, and the practice of policymaking formed the central tenet of the discussions presented in this week’s readings. This finding is certainly not revolutionary; in the US, countless major policy reform efforts have failed due to lack of realistic vision from policy analysts, who assume that policymakers, legislators, lobbyists, and the public will act in a “rational” capacity, in accordance with the requirements of the rational model (Etzioni, 1967, 385; Howlett, 2009, 145; Munger, 2000, 6). Policy analysts and theorists don’t have to dig deep to find that rational thinking rarely dictates how policy decisions are made, or gain advocates or critics.

In the US, the majority of policy decisions are not made by direct referendum; voters elect legislators whom they think will best represent their own social and economic interests and support the implementation of corresponding laws and policies. As in most (all?) democracies, the basic principle is that the majority rules: each district, state, etc., in theory elects officials that best represent the political interests of the majority. In national elections, the totality of state’s electoral votes reflects the political preferences of the majority of the population.  This seems, yes, rational.

Yet, the successful reelection of Obama, and the consistent low poll ratings of the Republican party have prompted a rethinking among some legislators of how the electoral college functions and how electoral votes are allocated. In New York magazine, Jonathan Chait reports on a new policy idea being floated among Republican legislators in states that went blue in the 2012 national election. He finds that while Virginia, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Ohio voted for Obama, Republicans control the state governments; governors, senators and congressman from these states have proposed new policy measures that would allocate electoral vote not “as a lump sum to the candidate who gets more votes, but piecemeal, to the winner of each congressional district” (Chait, 2013). Under this proposal, “Wisconsin, where Obama won by 7 percent, would have split its electoral votes 5-5,” and “Michigan, which Obama carried with 54 percent of the vote, would have given Romney nine of its sixteen electoral votes” (Chait, 2013).

 This impetus behind this policy proposal is not one might term “rational.” This reform is not intended to improve the functionality or equity of existing dysfunctional legislation; these legislators are acting out of self-interest, altering voting outcomes to favor their own political agenda. Electoral College alteration bills, like the one currently being floated in the Virginia State Senate, are being sponsored by legislators whose constituents are “discouraged by coming out because their votes don’t mean anything if they’re outvoted in metropolitan districts” (Chait, 2013). Phrased in this way, this policy proposal seems like a legitimate call for examining the effectiveness of the current electoral system, a concern echoed by Michigan House of Representatives speaker Jase Bolger, who said, that citizens from “various parts of the State of Michigan… don’t feel like their vote for president counts, because another area of the state may dominate that or could sway their vote” (Chait, 2013).

However, in practice, these legislators are seeking to allow the preferences of rural voters to be disproportionately represented by isolating their districts, and separating their votes from those in urban portions of the state, where the majority of the population lives. The political system already gives more power to people who live in low-population states. Voters in Wyoming have the same number of representatives in the US Senate as voters in California; this seems just, until you factor in the fact that California has about 66 times the population, let alone comparative analyses of each state’s contribution to GDP (Chait, 2013).

The fact that gerrymandering is being floated as a policy proposal, for the purpose of reinforcing political strongholds, demonstrates the disparity between the theoretical commitment of policymakers to “rationality” and their actual courses of action.

Sources:
-Chaite, Jonathan. “Who Needs to Win to Win?” New York. February 3, 2013. 
http://nymag.com/news/features/republican-party-2013-2/

-Etzioni, Amitai, “Mixed-Scanning: A ‘Third’ Approach to Decision-Making,” Public Administration Review, 27(5), 1967. (BB)

-Howlett, Michael and M. Ramesh. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, Oxford University Press, 2009 (3rd Edition).

-Munger, Michael C. Analyzing Policy: Choices, Conflicts and Practices, W.W. Norton & Co., 2000.




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    The stage model

    This week we introduce and critique the classic rational actor model of policy decision-making.  We also discuss some of the classic counter-models to the foundational stagist model.

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